From : Sebastian-A Molineus <smolineus@worldbank.org>
To : Maya Tskitishvili <m.tskitishvili@mrdi.gov.ge>; nturnava@moesd.gov.ge; etikaradze@moh.gov.ge; i.matchavariani@mof.ge
Subject : RE: Our standing WB offer to support the government of Georgia during the COVID-19 crisis
Cc : Ekaterine Mikabadze <emikabadze@moesd.gov.ge>; inadareishvili@moesd.gov.ge; tgabunia@moh.gov.ge; Evgenij Najdov <enajdov@worldbank.org>; Lire Ersado <lersado@worldbank.org>; Abdulaziz Faghi <afaghi@worldbank.org>; Jan Van Bilsen <jvanbilsen@ifc.org>; n.gagua@mof.ge
Received On : 06.05.2020 11:51
Attachments :

Dear colleagues – please find attached our COVID-19 compendium of trends & developments in key countries across the world. 

 

All countries and territories affected (cases/deaths):* Albania (820/31); Andorra (753/46); Angola (36/2); Armenia (2,619/40); Austria (15,650/606); Azerbaijan (2,060/26); Belarus (18,350/107); Belgium (50,509/8,016); Bosnia and Herzegovina (1,946/79); Bulgaria (1,704/80); Croatia (2,112/83); Czech Republic (7,878/254); Denmark (10,019/503); Estonia (1,711/55); Finland (5,412/246); France (169,583/25,204); Georgia (604/9); Germany (166,696/6,993); Gibraltar (144/4); Greece (2,642/146); Greenland (11/0); Hungary (3,065/363); Iceland (1,799/10); Ireland (21,983/1,339); Isle of Man (325/23); Italy (213,013/29,315); Jersey (293/24); Kazakhstan (4,205/29); Kosovo (855/27); Kyrgyzstan (843/11); Latvia (896/17); Liechtenstein (83/1); Lithuania (1,449/46); Luxembourg (3,840/96); Malta (482/5); Moldova (4,363/136); Monaco (98/4); Montenegro (324/8); Netherlands (41,286/5,185); North Macedonia (1,526/86); Norway (7,928/215); Poland (14,431/716); Romania (13,837/841); Russia (155,370/1,451); San Marino (589/41); Serbia (9,557/197); Slovakia (1,421/25); Slovenia (1,445/98); Spain (239,639/25,428); Sweden (23,216/2,854); Switzerland (30,009/1,795); Tajikistan (293/7); Turkey (129,491/3,520); Ukraine (12,697/316); United Kingdom (196,239/29,502); United States (1,199,238/70,646); Uzbekistan (2,207/10)

 

For real time* updates:  https://gisanddata.maps.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423467b48e9ecf6

 

*Please note there may be a lag in reporting.

 

Country Response 

United Kingdom

Austria

Croatia

France

Germany

Italy    

Netherlands

Poland

Russia

Spain

Turkey

Ukraine

United States

 

A close up of a map

Description automatically generated

Kind regards,

Sebastian

 

 

Sebastian Molineus
Regional Director for the South Caucasus
Europe and Central Asia
+995 (32) 291 6238
M +995 (577) 78 7821
M +1 (202) 492-3914
E  smolineus@worldbank.org
W www.worldbank.org/en/region/eca

 @smolineus

www.linkedin.com/in/molineus/

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

From: Sebastian-A Molineus
Sent: Monday, May 04, 2020 8:52 PM
To: Maya Tskitishvili ; nturnava@moesd.gov.ge; etikaradze@moh.gov.ge; i.matchavariani@mof.ge
Cc: Ekaterine Mikabadze ; inadareishvili@moesd.gov.ge; tgabunia@moh.gov.ge; Evgenij Najdov ; Lire Ersado ; Abdulaziz Faghi ; Jan Van Bilsen ; n.gagua@mof.ge
Subject: Re: Our standing WB offer to support the government of Georgia during the COVID-19 crisis

 

Dear colleagues - in case you have not yet seen, the link below is the UK government’s draft plan to ease the lockdown measures in the workplace.  As it is rather detailed there may be a number of ideas of interest to your own plans. 


From: Sebastian-A Molineus <smolineus@worldbank.org>
Sent: Monday, May 4, 2020 17:35
To: Maya Tskitishvili; nturnava@moesd.gov.ge; etikaradze@moh.gov.ge; 'i.matchavariani@mof.ge'
Cc: 'n.gagua@mof.ge'; Ekaterine Mikabadze; inadareishvili@moesd.gov.ge; tgabunia@moh.gov.ge; Evgenij Najdov; Lire Ersado; Abdulaziz Faghi; Jan Van Bilsen
Subject: RE: Our standing WB offer to support the government of Georgia during the COVID-19 crisis

 

Dear colleagues –

 

FYI, attached a presentation on lessons-learned to ensure for adherence to COVID-19 guidelines. More concretely, the presentation focuses on how to ensure for effective communication campaigns and better leverage existing cash transfer programs to this end.   

 

Kind regards,

Sebastian

 

 

Sebastian Molineus
Regional Director for the South Caucasus
Europe and Central Asia
+995 (32) 291 6238
M +995 (577) 78 7821
M +1 (202) 492-3914
E  smolineus@worldbank.org
W www.worldbank.org/en/region/eca

 @smolineus

www.linkedin.com/in/molineus/

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

From: Sebastian-A Molineus
Sent: Sunday, May 03, 2020 4:28 PM
To: 'Maya Tskitishvili' <m.tskitishvili@mrdi.gov.ge>; nturnava@moesd.gov.ge; 'etikaradze@moh.gov.ge' <etikaradze@moh.gov.ge>; i.matchavariani@mof.ge
Cc: n.gagua@mof.ge; 'Ekaterine Mikabadze' <emikabadze@moesd.gov.ge>; 'inadareishvili@moesd.gov.ge' <inadareishvili@moesd.gov.ge>; 'tgabunia@moh.gov.ge' <tgabunia@moh.gov.ge>; Evgenij Najdov <enajdov@worldbank.org>; Lire Ersado <lersado@worldbank.org>; Abdulaziz Faghi <afaghi@worldbank.org>; Jan Van Bilsen <jvanbilsen@ifc.org>
Subject: RE: Our standing WB offer to support the government of Georgia during the COVID-19 crisis

 

Dear colleagues –

 

Please find attached the World Bank’s weekly update on Social Protection measures across the world.  Please, note, that the matrix of country interventions has been modernized/revamped to offer a more user-friendly experience, preceded by a rapid “country at a glance” overview of key measures in place. Lots of action in 159 countries (8 more since last week). A remarkable uptick of measures in social insurance, in addition to social safety net and labor.


At the bottom of this message you will further find an update on broader COVID-19 trends & developments globally.

 

Kind regards,

Sebastian

 

 

159 x 752 As of today, a total of 159 countries (8 more since last week) have planned, introduced or adapted 752 social protection measures in response to COVID-19. This is over a triple in the number of countries and an eight-fold increase in measures since the first edition of this living paper (March 20). This week’s new entries include Congo, Dominica, Gambia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Turks and Caicos, and Tuvalu.

 

32.4% Cash transfers include a mix of both new and pre-existing programs of various duration and generosity. Cash transfers include 244 COVID-related measures representing one-third (32.4%) of total COVID-related social protection programs. About 59% of cash transfer measures (122 out of 207) are new programs in 89 countries, while one-fourth of measures (26%) are one-off payments. The average duration of transfers is 2.9 months. The size of transfers is relatively generous, or 25% of monthly GDP per capita in respective countries. On average, transfers increased by 88% compared to average pre-COVID transfer levels (where data is available for a subset of 14 countries).

 

3 Social assistance is being adapted in three ways. This includes expanding coverage, increasing benefits, and making administrative requirements simpler and more user-friendly. Combined, those adaptations in social assistance benefit over 1.48 billion people (individuals). Specifically, for cash transfers administrative adaptations are occurring in 27 countries. Their coverage extension is underway in 87 countries: this includes expanding coverage of existing programs (7 countries) and providing new programs in, as mentioned, 89 countries. Combined, those adaptations across administration, generosity and coverage in cash transfers benefit over 1.06 billion people. If we only consider coverage (horizontal expansion) of new and existing cash transfer schemes, these cover an estimated 566.5 million people.

 

143% Cash transfer programs are more than doubling in coverage, including an average of 143% in scale up levels. Preliminary analysis for a subset of cash transfer programs with comparable data allowed to estimate the scale up of programs relative to pre-COVID19 levels. Countries like the Philippines and El Salvador are quadrupling their coverage (in the case of Philippines also via multiple new programs), while even countries in Africa like Mauritania are almost doubling coverage.

 

200+ In terms of social insurance, there has been a remarkable uptick in measures recently – now breaking the ceiling of 200 measures. Gustavo Demarco, guest co-author for this edition, provides us with an overview of key issues and trends in social insurance in COVID-response

 

50%+ Labor market interventions remain a key area of action. Wage subsidies continue to dominate those interventions, including accounting for over half of the LM portfolio. Our guest co-author Indhira Santos explores the variety of ways in which those subsidies are being implemented across countries, as well as broader issues in the world of labor market COVID interventions.

 

0.6% What is the full level of investment going into social protection COVID-19 response? Our preliminary estimates indicate a level slightly higher than half-trillion (567 billion) in US dollars. Social assistance spending equals $539 billion, $488 of which in HICs. For the moment, LIC are investing $247 million in social assistance, while MICs about $50 billion ($23 billion of which in India). Defined in these terms, the overall global volume of social protection response to COVID-19 is 0.6% of global GDP (nearly $85 trillion).

 

-------------------------------------------

This and previous 143 links editions are available online here

 

 

Country updates:

 

All countries and territories affected (cases/deaths):* Armenia (2,148/33); Austria (15,531/589); Azerbaijan (1,854/24); Belarus (14,917/93); Belgium (49,032/7,703); Bosnia and Herzegovina (1,781/70); Bulgaria (1,555/68); Croatia (2,085/75); Cyprus (857/20); Czech Republic (7,726/240); Denmark (9,509/460); Estonia (1,694/52); Finland (5,051/218); France (169,053/24,594); Georgia (566/6); Germany (163,855/6,670); Gibraltar (144/4); Greece (2,612/140); Greenland (11/0); Holy See (11/0); Hungary (2,863/323); Iceland (1,798/10); Ireland (20,833/1,265); Isle of Man (315/22); Italy (207,428/28,236); Jersey (290/23); Kazakhstan (3,551/25); Kosovo (806/22); Kyrgyzstan (756/8); Latvia (870/15); Liechtenstein (83/1); Lithuania (1,449/45); Luxembourg (3,802/92); Malta (467/4); Moldova (3,980/122); Monaco (98/4); Montenegro (322/7); Netherlands (39,988/4,893); North Macedonia (1,494/81); Norway (7,770/210); Poland (13,105/651); Portugal (25,351/1,007); Romania (12,567/744); Russia (114,431/1,169); San Marino (580/41); Serbia (9,009/179); Slovakia (1,403/23); Slovenia (1,434/92); Spain (239,639/24,543); Sweden (21,520/2,653); Switzerland (29,705/1,754); Tajikistan (15/0); Turkey (122,392/3,258); Ukraine (10,861/272); United Kingdom (177,454/27,510); US (1,094,640/64,324); Uzbekistan (2,075/9)

 

For real time* updates:  https://gisanddata.maps.arcgis.com/apps/opsdashboard/index.html#/bda7594740fd40299423467b48e9ecf6

 

*Please note there may be a lag in reporting.

 

Country Response 

Italy    

·       Deaths from the COVID-19 epidemic in Italy climbed by 269 on Friday to 28,236 and the number of confirmed cases reaches 207,428; there are 100,943 active cases, of which 1,578 people are in intensive care and 78,249 have recovered

·       PM apologized on Friday to millions of struggling Italians who have yet to receive long-promised financial aid meant to help them get through the coronavirus crisis

Azerbaijan

·       Azerbaijan has extended partial lockdown measures until May 31

Czech Republic

·       The Czech Republic outlined rules on Friday for cinemas, hairdressers and other businesses to re-open on May 11; however, food and drinks are banned at the movies; hairstylists will need to wear both a mask and a protective shield, and manicurists and pedicurists must also wear gloves, with their customers must keep two meters apart

France

·       President warned on Friday that the end of the national lockdown on May 11 would only be a first step as France looks to move out of the crisis created by the outbreak of the coronavirus

Greece

·       Greek workers and students wearing masks and gloves lined up outside parliament to commemorate May Day, defying a government ban on movement imposed to fight the coronavirus

Hungary

·       Hungary needs to prepare for a potential second wave of coronavirus cases in October and November after a likely slowdown in the outbreak’s infection rate in the summer, PM said

Ireland

·       Ireland on Friday announced the first small steps to easing restrictions to slow the spread of the coronavirus and laid out a roadmap for a gradual re-opening of the economy over the coming months if the virus can be kept under control

·       Ireland’s cabinet is currently agreeing to a slight easing of coronavirus restrictions that will allow those aged over 70 to go outside of their homes

Portugal

·       Hundreds gathered in Portugal’s capital Lisbon on Friday to celebrate Labor Day, observing strict social distancing rules in a smaller-than-usual event to show solidarity with those left jobless due to the coronavirus outbreak

Russia

·       Russia on Friday reported a record daily rise in the number of confirmed coronavirus cases, with 7,933 cases reported, bringing the total to 114,431; 96 people had died, raising the death toll up to 1,169

Spain

·       Spain’s coronavirus death toll rose to 24,824 on Friday as 281 more people died; the number of cases rose to a total 215,216

·       Spain closed a giant temporary hospital in Madrid that had become a symbol of its fight against the coronavirus pandemic on Friday and people prepared to emerge from their homes for walks in the street after seven weeks of strict lockdown

Turkey

·       The number of people who have died from COVID-19 in Turkey has risen by 84 to 3,258, and 2,188 new cases has brought the total number of cases to 122,392

United Kingdom

·       Britain has hit its target of carrying out 100,000 COVID-19 tests a day, health minister said on Friday, stressing that the program was crucial to helping ease a national lockdown; 122,347 tests were conducted on Friday

·       Many Britons would be uncomfortable leaving their homes even if the government ordered the lifting lockdown restrictions in a month’s time, according to a poll on Friday

·       People from some ethnic minorities in Britain are dying in disproportionate numbers from COVID-19, possibly in part because they are more likely to work in healthcare and other sectors most exposed to the virus, a leading think tank said on Friday

United States

·       The U.S. Navy hospital ship Comfort departed New York harbor, just a month after arriving to help ease the strain on overburdened city hospitals dealing with the novel coronavirus outbreak

·       U.S. manufacturing activity plunged to an 11-year low in April as the novel coronavirus wreaked havoc on supply chains, suggesting the economy was sinking deeper into recession

·       Treasury said private schools with significant endowments and have taken loans from the coronavirus stimulus law should return them

·       A report released by CDC highlighted four main factors that accelerated transmission in March: 1) continued importation of the virus by travelers infected elsewhere, such as on cruise ships; 2) attendance at professional and social events, which amplified the spread; 3) introduction of the virus into facilities prone to amplification, including nursing homes and high-density urban areas; 4) problems detecting virus, including limited testing, the virus’ emergence during flu season, and “cryptic transmission” from people who were asymptomatic or pre-symptomatic

·       More than 4,900 workers in meat and poultry processing facilities have contracted Covid-19 and at least 20 have died, according to CDC report released Friday

·       New York Governor said all state schools would stay closed for the rest of the academic year due to the coronavirus pandemic, even as hospitalizations and the daily death toll fell to their lowest levels in more than a month

·       New York City’s subway is taking the unprecedented step of halting overnight service in order to clean train cars, a likely prelude to bigger changes as the largest U.S. mass transit system works to rebound from a pandemic that has slashed ridership

·       Hundreds of demonstrators gathered in Huntington Beach, California, a day after the governor announced an order to close all beaches in Orange County

 

 

 

Kind regards,

Sebastian

 

 

Sebastian Molineus
Regional Director for the South Caucasus
Europe and Central Asia
+995 (32) 291 6238
M +995 (577) 78 7821
M +1 (202) 492-3914
E  smolineus@worldbank.org
W www.worldbank.org/en/region/eca

 @smolineus

www.linkedin.com/in/molineus/

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

From: Sebastian-A Molineus
Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2020 8:08 PM
To: Maya Tskitishvili <m.tskitishvili@mrdi.gov.ge>; nturnava@moesd.gov.ge; i.matchavariani@mof.ge
Cc: n.gagua@mof.ge; Ekaterine Mikabadze <emikabadze@moesd.gov.ge>; inadareishvili@moesd.gov.ge; Evgenij Najdov <enajdov@worldbank.org>; Lire Ersado <lersado@worldbank.org>; Abdulaziz Faghi <afaghi@worldbank.org>; Jan Van Bilsen <jvanbilsen@ifc.org>
Subject: RE: Our standing WB offer to support the government of Georgia during the COVID-19 crisis

 

Dear colleagues –

 

FYI and I trust you will find this COVID-19 update on how other countries are addressing/ leading their response to the pandemic useful.

 

Country Response 

Italy    

  • Italian PM defended himself on Tuesday from widespread criticism of his highly cautious plans for a slow-placed end to Europe’s longest coronavirus lockdown
  • Workers in face masks laid the final section of a new viaduct in Genoa on Tuesday, as Italy’s prime minister paid tribute to the 43 people killed when the road bridge it is replacing collapsed less than two years ago

Austria

  • Austria will take further steps to ease its lockdown on Friday, allowing events with up to 10 people and instructing the public they no longer need a specific reason to leave home, the government said on Tuesday

Czech Republic

  • The lower house of the Czech parliament voted on Tuesday to extend a state of emergency until May 17, a week less than the government had sought, as the country charts a course to emerge from a coronavirus lockdown earlier than forecast

France

  • France will begin to ease its coronavirus lockdown from May 11 to avoid an economic meltdown, PM said on Tuesday, but he warned that infections would spiral higher again if the country moved too swiftly
  • France will implement a new doctrine on COVID-19 testing from May 11 with the aim of testing everyone who has come into contact with people who are infected, and the government had set the goal of carrying out at least 700,000 tests per week
  • The French parliament will not discuss government plans for a coronavirus contact-tracing app during Tuesday’s debate about the end of the lockdown period
  • French secondary school pupils returning to school next month after a coronavirus lockdown will be required to wear masks
  • Non-essential French retailers can re-open their doors from May 11, but they will have the right to insist that shoppers wear masks on the premises

Germany

  • Governments should focus on climate protection when considering fiscal stimulus packages to support an economic recovery from the coronavirus pandemic, German Chancellor said

Greece

  • Greek PM said restrictions on citizens’ movements would be lifted and more shops allowed to reopen from May 4 in a gradual easing of a lockdown imposed to curb the spread of the new coronavirus

Hungary

  • Hungary’s government plans to ease the lockdown and has outlined of the plans on Tuesday; starting next week, smaller retail outlets may open and over the course of May, a gradual opening of hotels, restaurants and coffee shops may follow

Portugal

  • President said Portugal’s lockdown will be lifted gradually from May 3

Romania

  • A parliament election in Romania scheduled for late November or early December might not take place this year unless the new coronavirus spread is contained, President said

Russia

  • President extended coronavirus lockdown measures for another two weeks on Tuesday, while ordering his government to begin preparations for a gradual lifting of the curbs from mid-May

Spain

  • Spanish PM announced on Tuesday a four-phase plan to lift the lockdown with an aim to return to normality by the end of June; the lifting of the strict measures will begin on May 4 and vary from region to region depending on factors such as how the rate of infection evolves, the number of intensive care beds available locally and how regions comply with distancing rules, he said
  • On the tourism-dependent Spanish island of Mallorca, a total shutdown of hotels due to the coronavirus outbreak has destroyed livelihoods across the sector, from reception staff to farmers who provide food for restaurants

Turkey

  • Turkey’s government aims to begin reviving the economy in late May after a sharp slowdown due to measures to contain the coronavirus outbreak, while minimizing the risk of a second wave of infections, a senior official said on Tuesday
  • The traditional lighting that hangs between the minarets of Turkish mosques, usually packed for evening prayers in the holy month of Ramadan, is urging Turks to stay at home this year as the country battles the coronavirus pandemic

United Kingdom

  • Some children in the United Kingdom with no underlying health conditions have died from a rare inflammatory syndrome which researchers believe to be linked to COVID-19, Health Secretary said
  • Britain is not yet at the point of wanting to change its strict guidelines on social distancing to curb the spread of COVID-19, with the government focusing on reviewing the measures by May 7, PM said on Tuesday
  • Scotland’s First Minister has urged people to start wearing a face mask if they are in enclosed places such as public transport and shops, diverging for now from the official advice from London

Vatican

  • Pope Francis urged people to obey rules aimed at preventing a devastating second wave of infections as their leaders begin to ease coronavirus lockdowns

United States

  • A Turkish military plane carrying medical supplies and protective equipment was heading for the United States on Tuesday to deliver aid
  • Lawmakers in the House of Representatives will not return to Washington next week as planned, due to the continuing risk of coronavirus infection, Democratic leaders said on Tuesday, in a reversal of plans outlined only a day earlier
  • U.S is considering having passengers on international flights from coronavirus hot spots be tested for the virus
  • U.S meat processing plants facing concerns about coronavirus outbreaks may stay open to protect the country’s food supply, a senior administration official said
  • Tourists and other visitors to the U.S Capitol and adjacent congressional offices will continue to be suspended until May 16, Senate and House of Representatives officials said
  • New York Governor said that new hospitalizations for the novel coronavirus dropped to a one-month low and laid out a plan to employ thousands of case investigators under criteria for reopening his state
  • Detroit residents waited for hours on Tuesday to get free COVID-19 tests at a new facility that for the first time offered testing to people who did not already have symptoms of the disease and a doctor’s authorization for the test
  • Some California workplaces, schools and childcare facilities can gradually reopen once the state improves coronavirus testing and contact tracing, the state’s health officer said
  • Ohio was holding nominating contests largely by mail on Tuesday after voting originally scheduled for March 17 was delayed and in-person balloting curtailed, as the coronavirus pandemic further disrupted the U.S election season
  • YouTube said it would start showing text and links from third-party fact-checkers to U.S viewers, part of efforts to curb misinformation of COVID-19 on the site
  • As Detroit’s automakers seek to restart their U.S plants during the coronavirus pandemic, two health experts advising Michigan’s governor and the United Auto Workers union warned against an over-reliance on masks and face shields to keep workers safe
  • Fewer than half of Americans plan to go to sports events, concerts, movies and amusement parks when they reopen to the public until there is a proven coronavirus vaccine, according to a recent poll

 

 

Kind regards,

Sebastian

 

 

Sebastian Molineus
Regional Director for the South Caucasus
Europe and Central Asia
+995 (32) 291 6238
M +995 (577) 78 7821
M +1 (202) 492-3914
E  smolineus@worldbank.org
W www.worldbank.org/en/region/eca

 @smolineus

www.linkedin.com/in/molineus/

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

From: Sebastian-A Molineus
Sent: Monday, April 20, 2020 5:16 PM
To: i.matchavariani@mof.ge; nturnava@moesd.gov.ge; Mikheil Chkhenkeli <mchkhenkeli@mes.gov.ge>; Maya Tskitishvili <m.tskitishvili@mrdi.gov.ge>
Cc: n.gagua@mof.ge; Ekaterine Mikabadze <emikabadze@moesd.gov.ge>; inadareishvili@moesd.gov.ge; Evgenij Najdov <enajdov@worldbank.org>; Lire Ersado <lersado@worldbank.org>; Abdulaziz Faghi <afaghi@worldbank.org>; Jan Van Bilsen <jvanbilsen@ifc.org>
Subject: RE: Our standing WB offer to support the government of Georgia during the COVID-19 crisis

 

Dear colleagues –

 

I trust you all had a nice Easter weekend with your families.  For this coming week, please find below a series of publications and good practice notes prepared by the World Bank.  I trust you will forward these to your teams and other relevant government departments preparing the government’s policy responses; please do let me know if you would like for me to incl. others in this distribution list (I try to target as much as possible to avoid spamming you with emails). 

 

More concretely:

  • Phase 2 support: The first is a longer publication (“COVID-19 Policy Response.pdf”), which sets out to advise governments as they prepare for the second phase of the response to COVID-19, focusing on social protection and economic recovery.  This note addresses issues of interconnection between sectoral and thematic themes, prioritization and sequencing of policies, and presents different policy response options to countries based on their profile and conditions.
  • Education: The second is a paper entitled “COVID-19 Education Shocks and Policy Responses”.  I also attach a ppt titled “Plan Edu GP and COVID19 Operational support April 15” that summarizes country policy responses and possible World Bank operational responses in the three stages of: (i) coping; (ii) managing continuity; and (iii) improvement/acceleration. 
  • Social protection: I also attach a blog by our Global Director for Social Protection on how social protection can help countries cope with COVID-19: https://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/how-social-protection-can-help-countries-cope-covid-19.  Attached as well is the latest update on Social Protection measures being taken across the globe (titled: “Country SP COVID responses_April17.pdf”).
  • COVID-19 and the digital agenda: Please further see attached a document (“ICT_Response(Flattening the curve on COVID-19.pdf”) on how Korea responded to a pandemic using information and communication technology.  I believe there is a major opportunity to use the current crisis for Georgia to fully transition to the digital economy, i.e. to digitize govt. service delivery, embrace the FinTech agenda, as well as e-health agenda.    
  • Support to distressed businesses: A global compendium of reform measures taken by 38 countries on fiscal and regulatory relief being provided in support of distressed SMEs and large corporates, which you can find here (see interactive map) and on our WB Finance and Coronavirus (COVID-19) webpage. 
  • COVID-19 and trade: A note (“COVID-19 Trade Watch – April 2020.pdf”) tracking country and industry patterns, the depth of the decline of trade, and the eventual reversal.  Of note is the beginning of a dramatic drop in international trade as a result of COVID-19. The trade slowdown, initially most evident in China, is increasingly spreading to other regions.
  • Support to tourism: And finally, here is a paper on the impact and policy responses for the tourism sector during the COVID-19 pandemic.  https://worldbankgroup.sharepoint.com/sites/gge/Documents/COVID-19%20Response%20Documents/200403%20FCI%20Sector%20Note%20-%20Tourism%20and%20COVID%2019%20Key%202%20Pager%20CLEAN%20copy_Martha%20JP%20rev.pdf?deliveryName=DM11151

 

The OECD has created a useful Country Policy Tracker system that summarizes health, fiscal and social measures.  It is updated daily and includes developing countries as well. http://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/en/#key-impacts

 

Kind regards,

Sebastian

 

 

Sebastian Molineus
Regional Director for the South Caucasus
Europe and Central Asia
+995 (32) 291 6238
M +995 (577) 78 7821
M +1 (202) 492-3914
E  smolineus@worldbank.org
W www.worldbank.org/en/region/eca

 @smolineus

www.linkedin.com/in/molineus/

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

From: Sebastian-A Molineus
Sent: Friday, April 10, 2020 4:54 PM
To: i.matchavariani@mof.ge; nturnava@moesd.gov.ge
Cc: n.gagua@mof.ge; Ekaterine Mikabadze <emikabadze@moesd.gov.ge>; inadareishvili@moesd.gov.ge; Evgenij Najdov <enajdov@worldbank.org>; Lire Ersado <lersado@worldbank.org>; Abdulaziz Faghi <afaghi@worldbank.org>; Jan Van Bilsen <jvanbilsen@ifc.org>
Subject: RE: Our standing WB offer to support the government of Georgia during the COVID-19 crisis

 

Dear Natia and Ivane –

 

Please find attached three new World Bank policy notes to help our clients combat the COVID-19 crisis. 

  1. The first focuses on the tourism sector and looks at the crisis’ impact on the sector and policy responses. 
  2. The second is on revenue administration applications, looking at potential tax administration and customs measures to respond to the crisis. 
  3. And the third is an 2-page action plan on public debt management and essentially offers World Bank advisory support on how to finance their fiscal response. 

Kind regards,

Sebastian

 

 

Sebastian Molineus
Regional Director for the South Caucasus
Europe and Central Asia
+995 (32) 291 6238
M +995 (577) 78 7821
M +1 (202) 492-3914
E  smolineus@worldbank.org
W www.worldbank.org/en/region/eca

 @smolineus

www.linkedin.com/in/molineus/

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

From: Sebastian-A Molineus
Sent: Friday, April 03, 2020 9:37 PM
To: i.matchavariani@mof.ge; etikaradze@moh.gov.ge
Cc: n.gagua@mof.ge; tgabunia@moh.gov.ge; Evgenij Najdov <enajdov@worldbank.org>; Lire Ersado <lersado@worldbank.org>; Abdulaziz Faghi <afaghi@worldbank.org>; Jan Van Bilsen <jvanbilsen@ifc.org>
Subject: Re: Our standing WB offer to support the government of Georgia during the COVID-19 crisis

 

My last email for the week and over the weekend, I promise, but I did think it important to share this scientific article confirming the effectiveness of surgical face masks (contrary what was initially reported) as it could influence preventive measures taken by the govt. moving forward. 

 

Respiratory virus shedding in exhaled breath and efficacy of face masks | Nature Medicine

Respiratory virus shedding in exhaled breath and efficacy of face masks

·  ,03 April 2020

Nature Medicine (2020)Cite this article

Abstract

We identified seasonal human coronaviruses, influenza viruses and rhinoviruses in exhaled breath and coughs of children and adults with acute respiratory illness. Surgical face masks significantly reduced detection of influenza virus RNA in respiratory droplets and coronavirus RNA in aerosols, with a trend toward reduced detection of coronavirus RNA in respiratory droplets. Our results indicate that surgical face masks could prevent transmission of human coronaviruses and influenza viruses from symptomatic individuals.

Main

Respiratory virus infections cause a broad and overlapping spectrum of symptoms collectively referred to as acute respiratory virus illnesses (ARIs) or more commonly the ‘common cold’. Although mostly mild, these ARIs can sometimes cause severe disease and death1. These viruses spread between humans through direct or indirect contact, respiratory droplets (including larger droplets that fall rapidly near the source as well as coarse aerosols with aerodynamic diameter >5 µm) and fine-particle aerosols (droplets and droplet nuclei with aerodynamic diameter ≤5 µm)2,3. Although hand hygiene and use of face masks, primarily targeting contact and respiratory droplet transmission, have been suggested as important mitigation strategies against influenza virus transmission4, little is known about the relative importance of these modes in the transmission of other common respiratory viruses2,3,5. Uncertainties similarly apply to the modes of transmission of COVID-19 (refs. 6,7).

Some health authorities recommend that masks be worn by ill individuals to prevent onward transmission (source control)4,8. Surgical face masks were originally introduced to protect patients from wound infection and contamination from surgeons (the wearer) during surgical procedures, and were later adopted to protect healthcare workers against acquiring infection from their patients. However, most of the existing evidence on the filtering efficacy of face masks and respirators comes from in vitro experiments with nonbiological particles9,10, which may not be generalizable to infectious respiratory virus droplets. There is little information on the efficacy of face masks in filtering respiratory viruses and reducing viral release from an individual with respiratory infections8, and most research has focused on influenza11,12.

Here we aimed to explore the importance of respiratory droplet and aerosol routes of transmission with a particular focus on coronaviruses, influenza viruses and rhinoviruses, by quantifying the amount of respiratory virus in exhaled breath of participants with medically attended ARIs and determining the potential efficacy of surgical face masks to prevent respiratory virus transmission.

Results

We screened 3,363 individuals in two study phases, ultimately enrolling 246 individuals who provided exhaled breath samples (Extended Data Fig. 1). Among these 246 participants, 122 (50%) participants were randomized to not wearing a face mask during the first exhaled breath collection and 124 (50%) participants were randomized to wearing a face mask. Overall, 49 (20%) voluntarily provided a second exhaled breath collection of the alternate type.

Infections by at least one respiratory virus were confirmed by reverse transcription PCR (RT–PCR) in 123 of 246 (50%) participants. Of these 123 participants, 111 (90%) were infected by human (seasonal) coronavirus (n = 17), influenza virus (n = 43) or rhinovirus (n = 54) (Extended Data Figs. 1 and 2), including one participant co-infected by both coronavirus and influenza virus and another two participants co-infected by both rhinovirus and influenza virus. These 111 participants were the focus of our analyses.

There were some minor differences in characteristics of the 111 participants with the different viruses (Table 1a). Overall, 24% of participants had a measured fever ≥37.8 °C, with patients with influenza more than twice as likely than patients infected with coronavirus and rhinovirus to have a measured fever. Coronavirus-infected participants coughed the most with an average of 17 (s.d. = 30) coughs during the 30-min exhaled breath collection. The profiles of the participants randomized to with-mask versus without-mask groups were similar (Supplementary Table 1).

Table 1a Characteristics of individuals with symptomatic coronavirus, influenza virus or rhinovirus infection

We tested viral shedding (in terms of viral copies per sample) in nasal swabs, throat swabs, respiratory droplet samples and aerosol samples and compared the latter two between samples collected with or without a face mask (Fig. 1). On average, viral shedding was higher in nasal swabs than in throat swabs for each of coronavirus (median 8.1 log10 virus copies per sample versus 3.9), influenza virus (6.7 versus 4.0) and rhinovirus (6.8 versus 3.3), respectively. Viral RNA was identified from respiratory droplets and aerosols for all three viruses, including 30%, 26% and 28% of respiratory droplets and 40%, 35% and 56% of aerosols collected while not wearing a face mask, from coronavirus, influenza virus and rhinovirus-infected participants, respectively (Table 1b). In particular for coronavirus, we identified OC43 and HKU1 from both respiratory droplets and aerosols, but only identified NL63 from aerosols and not from respiratory droplets (Supplementary Table 2 and Extended Data Fig. 3).

Fig. 1: Efficacy of surgical face masks in reducing respiratory virus shedding in respiratory droplets and aerosols of symptomatic individuals with coronavirus, influenza virus or rhinovirus infection.

figure1

ac, Virus copies per sample collected in nasal swab (red), throat swab (blue) and respiratory droplets collected for 30min while not wearing (dark green) or wearing (light green) a surgical face mask, and aerosols collected for 30min while not wearing (brown) or wearing (orange) a face mask, collected from individuals with acute respiratory symptoms who were positive for coronavirus (a), influenza virus (b) and rhinovirus (c), as determined by RT–PCR in any samples. Pvalues for mask intervention as predictor of log10 virus copies per sample in an unadjusted univariate Tobit regression model which allowed for censoring at the lower limit of detection of the RT–PCR assay are shown, with significant differences in bold. For nasal swabs and throat swabs, all infected individuals were included (coronavirus, n=17; influenza virus, n=43; rhinovirus, n=54). For respiratory droplets and aerosols, numbers of infected individuals who provided exhaled breath samples while not wearing or wearing a surgical face mask, respectively were: coronavirus (n=10 and 11), influenza virus (n=23 and 28) and rhinovirus (n=36 and 32). A subset of participants provided exhaled breath samples for both mask interventions (coronavirus, n=4; influenza virus, n=8; rhinovirus, n=14). The box plots indicate the median with the interquartile range (lower and upper hinge) and ±1.5×interquartile range from the first and third quartile (lower and upper whiskers).

Table 1b Efficacy of surgical face masks in reducing respiratory virus frequency of detection and viral shedding in respiratory droplets and aerosols of symptomatic individuals with coronavirus, influenza virus or rhinovirus infection

We detected coronavirus in respiratory droplets and aerosols in 3 of 10 (30%) and 4 of 10 (40%) of the samples collected without face masks, respectively, but did not detect any virus in respiratory droplets or aerosols collected from participants wearing face masks, this difference was significant in aerosols and showed a trend toward reduced detection in respiratory droplets (Table 1b). For influenza virus, we detected virus in 6 of 23 (26%) and 8 of 23 (35%) of the respiratory droplet and aerosol samples collected without face masks, respectively. There was a significant reduction by wearing face masks to 1 of 27 (4%) in detection of influenza virus in respiratory droplets, but no significant reduction in detection in aerosols (Table 1b). Moreover, among the eight participants who had influenza virus detected by RT–PCR from without-mask aerosols, five were tested by viral culture and four were culture-positive. Among the six participants who had influenza virus detected by RT–PCR from with-mask aerosols, four were tested by viral culture and two were culture-positive. For rhinovirus, there were no significant differences between detection of virus with or without face masks, both in respiratory droplets and in aerosols (Table 1b). Conclusions were similar in comparisons of viral shedding (Table 1b). In addition, we found a significant reduction in viral shedding (Supplementary Table 2) in respiratory droplets for OC43 (Extended Data Fig. 4) and influenza B virus (Extended Data Fig. 5) and in aerosols for NL63 (Extended Data Fig. 4).

We identified correlations between viral loads in different samples (Extended Data Figs. 68) and some evidence of declines in viral shedding by time since onset for influenza virus but not for coronavirus or rhinovirus (Extended Data Fig. 9). In univariable analyses of factors associated with detection of respiratory viruses in various sample types, we did not identify significant association in viral shedding with days since symptom onset (Supplementary Table 3) for respiratory droplets or aerosols (Supplementary Tables 46).

A subset of participants (72 of 246, 29%) did not cough at all during at least one exhaled breath collection, including 37 of 147 (25%) during the without-mask and 42 of 148 (28%) during the with-mask breath collection. In the subset for coronavirus (n = 4), we did not detect any virus in respiratory droplets or aerosols from any participants. In the subset for influenza virus (n = 9), we detected virus in aerosols but not respiratory droplets from one participant. In the subset for rhinovirus (n = 17), we detected virus in respiratory droplets from three participants, and we detected virus in aerosols in five participants.

Discussion

Our results indicate that aerosol transmission is a potential mode of transmission for coronaviruses as well as influenza viruses and rhinoviruses. Published studies detected respiratory viruses13,14such as influenza12,15 and rhinovirus16 from exhaled breath, and the detection of SARS-CoV17and MERS-CoV18 from air samples (without size fractionation) collected from hospitals treating patients with severe acute respiratory syndrome and Middle East respiratory syndrome, but ours demonstrates detection of human seasonal coronaviruses in exhaled breath, including the detection of OC43 and HKU1 from respiratory droplets and NL63, OC43 and HKU1 from aerosols.

Our findings indicate that surgical masks can efficaciously reduce the emission of influenza virus particles into the environment in respiratory droplets, but not in aerosols12. Both the previous and current study used a bioaerosol collecting device, the Gesundheit-II (G-II)12,15,19, to capture exhaled breath particles and differentiated them into two size fractions, where exhaled breath coarse particles >5 μm (respiratory droplets) were collected by impaction with a 5-μm slit inertial Teflon impactor and the remaining fine particles ≤5 μm (aerosols) were collected by condensation in buffer. We also demonstrated the efficacy of surgical masks to reduce coronavirus detection and viral copies in large respiratory droplets and in aerosols (Table 1b). This has important implications for control of COVID-19, suggesting that surgical face masks could be used by ill people to reduce onward transmission.

Among the samples collected without a face mask, we found that the majority of participants with influenza virus and coronavirus infection did not shed detectable virus in respiratory droplets or aerosols, whereas for rhinovirus we detected virus in aerosols in 19 of 34 (56%) participants (compared to 4 of 10 (40%) for influenza and 8 of 23 (35%) for coronavirus). For those who did shed virus in respiratory droplets and aerosols, viral load in both tended to be low (Fig. 1). Given the high collection efficiency of the G-II (ref. 19) and given that each exhaled breath collection was conducted for 30 min, this might imply that prolonged close contact would be required for transmission to occur, even if transmission was primarily via aerosols, as has been described for rhinovirus colds20. Our results also indicate that there could be considerable heterogeneity in contagiousness of individuals with coronavirus and influenza virus infections.

The major limitation of our study was the large proportion of participants with undetectable viral shedding in exhaled breath for each of the viruses studied. We could have increased the sampling duration beyond 30 min to increase the viral shedding being captured, at the cost of acceptability in some participants. An alternative approach would be to invite participants to perform forced coughs during exhaled breath collection12. However, it was the aim of our present study to focus on recovering respiratory virus in exhaled breath in a real-life situation and we expected that some individuals during an acute respiratory illness would not cough much or at all. Indeed, we identified virus RNA in a small number of participants who did not cough at all during the 30-min exhaled breath collection, which would suggest droplet and aerosol routes of transmission are possible from individuals with no obvious signs or symptoms. Another limitation is that we did not confirm the infectivity of coronavirus or rhinovirus detected in exhaled breath. While the G-II was designed to preserve viability of viruses in aerosols, and in the present study we were able to identify infectious influenza virus in aerosols, we did not attempt to culture coronavirus or rhinovirus from the corresponding aerosol samples.

Methods

Study design

Participants were recruited year-round from March 2013 through May 2016 in a general outpatient clinic of a private hospital in Hong Kong. As routine practice, clinic staff screened all individuals attending the clinics for respiratory and any other symptoms regardless of the purpose of the visit at triage. Study staff then approached immediately those who reported at least one of the following symptoms of ARI for further screening: fever ≥37.8 °C, cough, sore throat, runny nose, headache, myalgia and phlegm. Individuals who reported ≥2 ARI symptoms, within 3 d of illness onset and ≥11 years of age were eligible to participate. After explaining the study to and obtaining informed consent from the participants, a rapid influenza diagnostic test, the Sofia Influenza A + B Fluorescent Immunoassay Analyzer (cat. no. 20218, Quidel), was used to identify influenza A or B virus infection as an incentive to participate. All participants provided a nasal swab for the rapid test and an additional nasal swab and a separate throat swab for subsequent virologic confirmation at the laboratory. All participants also completed a questionnaire to record basic information including age, sex, symptom severity, medication, medical conditions and smoking history. In the first phase of the study from March 2013 to February 2014 (‘Influenza Study’), the result of the rapid test was used to determine eligibility for further participation in the study and exhaled breath collection, whereas in the second phase of the study from March 2014 to May 2016 (‘Respiratory Virus Study’), the rapid test did not affect eligibility. Eligible participants were then invited to provide an exhaled breath sample for 30 min in the same clinic visit.

Before exhaled breath collection, each participant was randomly allocated in a 1:1 ratio to either wearing a surgical face mask (cat. no. 62356, Kimberly-Clark) or not during the collection. To mimic the real-life situation, under observation by the study staff, participants were asked to attach the surgical mask themselves, but instruction on how to wear the mask properly was given when the participant wore the mask incorrectly. Participants were instructed to breathe as normal during the collection, but (natural) coughing was allowed and the number of coughs was recorded by study staff. Participants were then invited to provide a second exhaled breath sample of the alternate type (for example if the participant was first assigned to wearing a mask they would then provide a second sample without a mask), but most participants did not agree to stay for a second measurement because of time constraints. Participants were compensated for each 30-min exhaled breath collection with a supermarket coupon worth approximately US$30 and all participants were gifted a tympanic thermometer worth approximately US$20.

Ethical approval

Written informed consent was obtained from all participants ≥18 years of age and written informed consent was obtained from parents or legal guardians of participants 11–17 years of age in addition to their own written informed consent. The study protocol was approved by the Institutional Review Board of The University of Hong Kong and the Clinical and Research Ethics Committee of Hong Kong Baptist Hospital.

Collection of swabs and exhaled breath particles

Nasal swabs and throat swabs were collected separately, placed in virus transport medium, stored and transported to the laboratory at 2–8 °C and the virus transport medium was aliquoted and stored at −70 °C until further analysis. Exhaled breath particles were captured and differentiated into two size fractions, the coarse fraction containing particles with aerodynamic diameter >5 μm (referred to here as ‘respiratory droplets’), which included droplets up to approximately 100 µm in diameter and the fine fraction with particles ≤5 μm (referred to here as ‘aerosols’) by the G-II bioaerosol collecting device12,15,19. In the G-II device, exhaled breath coarse particles >5 μm were collected by a 5-μm slit inertial Teflon impactor and the remaining fine particles ≤5 μm were condensed and collected into approximately 170 ml of 0.1% BSA/PBS. Both the impactor and the condensate were stored and transported to the laboratory at 2–8 °C. The virus on the impactor was recovered into 1 ml and the condensate was concentrated into 2 ml of 0.1% BSA/PBS, aliquoted and stored at −70 °C until further analysis. In a validation study, the G-II was able to recover over 85% of fine particles >0.05 µm in size and had comparable collection efficiency of influenza virus as the SKC BioSampler19.

Laboratory testing

Samples collected from the two studies were tested at the same time. Nasal swab samples were first tested by a diagnostic-use viral panel, xTAG Respiratory Viral Panel (Abbott Molecular) to qualitatively detect 12 common respiratory viruses and subtypes including coronaviruses (NL63, OC43, 229E and HKU1), influenza A (nonspecific, H1 and H3) and B viruses, respiratory syncytial virus, parainfluenza virus (types 1–4), adenovirus, human metapneumovirus and enterovirus/rhinovirus. After one or more of the candidate respiratory viruses was detected by the viral panel from the nasal swab, all the samples from the same participant (nasal swab, throat swab, respiratory droplets and aerosols) were then tested with RT–PCR specific for the candidate virus(es) for determination of virus concentration in the samples. Infectious influenza virus was identified by viral culture using MDCK cells as described previously21, whereas viral culture was not performed for coronavirus and rhinovirus.

Statistical analyses

The primary outcome of the study was virus generation rate in tidal breathing of participants infected by different respiratory viruses and the efficacy of face masks in preventing virus dissemination in exhaled breath, separately considering the respiratory droplets and aerosols. The secondary outcomes were correlation between viral shedding in nose swabs, throat swabs, respiratory droplets and aerosols and factors affecting viral shedding in respiratory droplets and aerosols.

We identified three groups of respiratory viruses with the highest frequency of infection as identified by RT–PCR, namely coronavirus (including NL63, OC43, HKU1 and 229E), influenza virus and rhinovirus, for further statistical analyses. We defined viral shedding as log10 virus copies per sample and plotted viral shedding in each sample (nasal swab, throat swab, respiratory droplets and aerosols); the latter two were stratified by mask intervention. As a proxy for the efficacy of face masks in preventing transmission of respiratory viruses via respiratory droplet and aerosol routes, we compared the respiratory virus viral shedding in respiratory droplet and aerosol samples between participants wearing face masks or not, by comparing the frequency of detection with a two-sided Fisher’s exact test and by comparing viral load (defined as log10 virus copies per sample) by an unadjusted univariate Tobit regression model, which allowed for censoring at the lower limit of detection of the RT–PCR assay. We also used the unadjusted univariate Tobit regression to investigate factors affecting viral shedding in respiratory droplets and aerosols without mask use, for example age, days since symptom onset, previous influenza vaccination, current medication and number of coughs during exhaled breath collection. We investigated correlations between viral shedding in nasal swab, throat swab, respiratory droplets and aerosols with scatter-plots and calculated the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between any two types of samples. We imputed 0.3 log10 virus copies ml−1 for undetectable values before transformation to log10 virus copies per sample. All analyses were conducted with R v.3.6.0 (ref. 22) and the VGAM package v.1.1.1 (ref. 23).

Reporting Summary

Further information on research design is available in the Nature Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.

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Acknowledgements

This work was supported by the General Research Fund of the University Grants Committee (grant no. 765811), the Health and Medical Research Fund (grant no. 13120592) and a commissioned grant of the Food and Health Bureau and the Theme-based Research Scheme (project no. T11-705/14-N) of the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong SAR Government. We acknowledge colleagues including R. O. P. Fung, A. K. W. Li, T. W. Y. Ng, T. H. C. So, P. Wu and Y. Xie for technical support in preparing and conducting this study and enrolling participants; J. K. M. Chan, S. Y. Ho, Y. Z. Liu and A. Yu for laboratory support; S. Ferguson, W. K. Leung, J. Pantelic, J. Wei and M. Wolfson for technical support in constructing and maintaining the G-II device; V. J. Fang, L. M. Ho and T. T. K. Lui for setting up the database; and C. W. Y. Cheung, L. F. K. Cheung, P. T. Y. Ching, A. C. H. Lai, D. W. Y. Lam, S. S. Y. Lo, A. S. K. Luk and other colleagues at the Outpatient Center and Infection Control Team of Hong Kong Baptist Hospital for facilitating this study.

Author information

  1. These authors jointly supervised this work: Donald K. Milton, Benjamin J. Cowling.

Affiliations

  1. WHO Collaborating Centre for Infectious Disease Epidemiology and Control, School of Public Health, Li Ka Shing Faculty of Medicine, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
    • Nancy H. L. Leung
    • , Daniel K. W. Chu
    • , Eunice Y. C. Shiu
    • , Benien J. P. Hau
    • , Hui-Ling Yen
    • , Dennis K. M. Ip
    • , J. S. Malik Peiris
    • , Wing-Hong Seto
    • , Gabriel M. Leung
    •  & Benjamin J. Cowling
  1. Department of Microbiology, Li Ka Shing Faculty of Medicine, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
    • Kwok-Hung Chan
  1. Department of Environmental Health, Harvard School of Public Health, Boston, MA, USA
    • James J. McDevitt
  1. Department of Surgery, Queen Mary Hospital, Hong Kong, China
    • Benien J. P. Hau
  1. Department of Mechanical Engineering, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
    • Yuguo Li
  1. Department of Pathology, Hong Kong Baptist Hospital, Hong Kong, China
    • Wing-Hong Seto
  1. Maryland Institute for Applied Environmental Health, School of Public Health, University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA
    • Donald K. Milton

Contributions

All authors meet the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors criteria for authorship. The study protocol was drafted by N.H.L.L. and B.J.C. Data were collected by N.H.L.L., E.Y.C.S. and B.J.P.H. Laboratory testing was performed by D.K.W.C. and K.-H.C. Statistical analyses were conducted by N.H.L.L. N.H.L.L. and B.J.C. wrote the first draft of the manuscript, and all authors provided critical review and revision of the text and approved the final version.

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Benjamin J. Cowling.

Ethics declarations

Competing interests

B.J.C. consults for Roche and Sanofi Pasteur. The authors declare no other competing interests.

Additional information

Peer review information Alison Farrell was the primary editor on this article and managed its editorial process and peer review in collaboration with the rest of the editorial team.

Publisher’s note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Extended data

Extended Data Fig. 1

Participant enrolment, randomization of mask intervention and identification of respiratory virus infection.

Extended Data Fig. 2 Weekly number of respiratory virus infections identified by RT-PCR in symptomatic individuals who had provided exhaled breath samples (respiratory droplets and aerosols) during the study period.

Blue, coronavirus; red, influenza virus; yellow, rhinovirus; green, other respiratory viruses including human metapneumovirus, parainfluenza virus, respiratory syncytial virus and adenovirus; white, no respiratory virus infection identified.

Extended Data Fig. 3 Respiratory virus shedding in (a) nasal swab, (b) throat swab, (c) respiratory droplets and (d) aerosols in symptomatic individuals with coronavirus NL63, coronavirus OC43, coronavirus HKU1, influenza A and influenza B virus infection.

For nasal swabs and throat swabs, all infected individuals identified by RT-PCR in any collected samples were included: coronavirus NL63 (n = 8), coronavirus OC43 (n = 5), coronavirus HKU1 (n = 4), influenza A virus (n = 31) and influenza B virus (n = 14). For respiratory droplets and aerosols, only infected individuals who provided exhaled breath samples while not wearing a surgical face mask were included: coronavirus NL63 (n = 3), coronavirus OC43 (n = 3), coronavirus HKU1 (n = 4), influenza A virus (n = 19) and influenza B virus (n = 6). The box plots indicate the median with the interquartile range (lower and upper hinge) and ± 1.5 × interquartile range from the first and third quartile (lower and upper whisker). Dark blue, coronavirus NL63; light blue, coronavirus OC43; brown, coronavirus HKU1; red, influenza A virus; orange, influenza B virus.

Extended Data Fig. 4 Efficacy of surgical face masks in reducing respiratory virus shedding in respiratory droplets and aerosols of symptomatic individuals with seasonal coronaviruses including (a) coronavirus NL63, (b) coronavirus OC43 and (c) coronavirus HKU1.

The figure shows the virus copies per sample collected in nasal swab (red), throat swab (blue), respiratory droplets collected for 30 min while not wearing (dark green) or wearing (light green) a surgical face mask and aerosols collected for 30 min while not wearing (brown) or wearing (orange) a face mask, collected from individuals with acute respiratory symptoms who were positive for coronavirus NL63, coronavirus OC43 and coronavirus HKU1 as determined by RT-PCR in any samples. P values for mask intervention as predictor of log10virus copies per sample in an unadjusted univariate Tobit regression model which allowed for censoring at the lower limit of detection of the RT-PCR assay are shown, with significant differences in bold. For nasal swabs and throat swabs, all infected individuals were included (coronavirus NL63, n = 8; coronavirus OC43, n = 5; coronavirus HKU1, n = 4). For respiratory droplets and aerosols, numbers of infected individuals who provided exhaled breath samples while not wearing or wearing a surgical face mask, respectively were: coronavirus NL63 (n = 3 and 5), coronavirus OC43 (n = 3 and 4), coronavirus HKU1 (n = 4 and 2). A subset of participants provided exhaled breath samples for both mask interventions (coronavirus NL63, n = 0; coronavirus OC43, n = 2; coronavirus HKU1, n = 2).

Extended Data Fig. 5 Efficacy of surgical face masks in reducing respiratory virus shedding in respiratory droplets and aerosols of symptomatic individuals with seasonal influenza viruses including (a) influenza A and (b) influenza B virus.

The figure shows the virus copies per sample collected in nasal swab (red), throat swab (blue), respiratory droplets collected for 30 min while not wearing (dark green) or wearing (light green) a surgical face mask and aerosols collected for 30 min while not wearing (brown) or wearing (orange) a face mask, collected from individuals with acute respiratory symptoms who were positive for influenza A and influenza B virus as determined by RT-PCR in any samples. P values for mask intervention as predictor of log10 virus copies per sample in an unadjusted univariate Tobit regression model which allowed for censoring at the lower limit of detection of the RT-PCR assay are shown, with significant differences in bold. For nasal swabs and throat swabs, all infected individuals were included (influenza A virus, n = 31; influenza B virus, n = 14). For respiratory droplets and aerosols, numbers of infected individuals who provided exhaled breath samples while not wearing or wearing a surgical face mask, respectively were: influenza A virus (n = 19 and 19), influenza B virus (n = 6 and 10). A subset of participants provided exhaled breath samples for both mask interventions (influenza A virus, n = 7; influenza B virus, n = 2).

Extended Data Fig. 6 Correlation of coronavirus viral shedding between different samples (nasal swab, throat swab, respiratory droplets and aerosols) in symptomatic individuals with seasonal coronavirus infection.

For nasal swabs and throat swabs, all infected individuals were included (n = 17). For respiratory droplets and aerosols, only infected individuals who provided exhaled breath samples while not wearing a surgical face mask were included (n = 10). r, the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient.

Extended Data Fig. 7 Correlation of influenza viral shedding between different samples (nasal swab, throat swab, respiratory droplets and aerosols) in symptomatic individuals with seasonal influenza infection.

For nasal swabs and throat swabs, all infected individuals were included (n = 43). For respiratory droplets and aerosols, only infected individuals who provided exhaled breath samples while not wearing a surgical face mask were included (n = 23). r, the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient.

Extended Data Fig. 8 Correlation of rhinovirus viral shedding between different samples (nasal swab, throat swab, respiratory droplets and aerosols) in symptomatic individuals with rhinovirus infection.

For nasal swabs and throat swabs, all infected individuals were included (n = 54). For respiratory droplets and aerosols, only infected individuals who provided exhaled breath samples while not wearing a surgical face mask were included (n = 36). r, the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient.

Extended Data Fig. 9 Respiratory virus shedding in respiratory droplets and aerosols stratified by days from symptom onset for (a) coronavirus, (b) influenza virus or (c) rhinovirus.

The figures shows the virus copies per sample collected in nasal swab (red), throat swab (blue), respiratory droplets (dark green) and aerosols (brown) collected for 30 min while not wearing a surgical face mask, stratified by the number of days from symptom onset on which the respiratory droplets and aerosols were collected. For nasal swabs and throat swabs, all infected individuals were included (coronavirus, n = 17; influenza virus, n = 43; rhinovirus, n = 54). For respiratory droplets and aerosols, numbers of infected individuals who provided exhaled breath samples while not wearing or wearing a surgical face mask, respectively were: coronavirus (n = 10 and 11), influenza virus (n = 23 and 28), rhinovirus (n = 36 and 32). A subset of participants provided exhaled breath samples for both mask interventions (coronavirus, n = 4; influenza virus, n = 8; rhinovirus, n = 14). The box plots indicate the median with the interquartile range (lower and upper hinge) and ± 1.5 × interquartile range from the first and third quartile (lower and upper whisker).

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Leung, N.H.L., Chu, D.K.W., Shiu, E.Y.C. et al. Respiratory virus shedding in exhaled breath and efficacy of face masks. Nat Med(2020). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41591-020-0843-2

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Kind regards, 

Sebastian 

 

Sebastian Molineus

Regional Director for the South Caucasus

Europe and Central Asia, The World Bank

Follow me on Twitter @SMolineus

 

 

Sent from my iPhone

 

On Apr 3, 2020, at 19:33, Sebastian-A Molineus wrote:

 Dear colleagues - 

 

Please find below and attached an update on social protection measures from across the world. 

 

FYI, the number of countries with measures in place is now triple-digit; more cash transfers than ever; COVID-related social assistance is benefiting almost 600 million people; lots of action in social insurance (mostly paid sick leave) as well as labor markets (largely wage subsidies).

Here are stylized facts to help synthesize current global trends: 

 

Fact #1. As of today, a total of 106 countries have introduced or adapted social protection and jobs programs in response to COVID-19. This is an 26% increase since last week (when countries were 84), while the number of programs grew by almost 50%, i.e., from 283 to 418. Among classes of interventions, social assistance (non-contributory transfers) keeps being the most widely used (including a total of 241 programs), followed by actions in social insurance (116) and supply-side labor market interventions (61).

 

Fact #2. Within social assistance, cash transfer programs are clearly the most widely used intervention by governments: these include 124 programs in 71 countries, with 54 new initiatives introduced specifically as COVID-19 response in 36 countries. Those 124 programs would increase to 149 if social pensions, public works, childcare support and one-off universal basic income (or helicopter money) are considered. Such overall cash-based portfolio represents over one-third of total social protection programs (35.6%) (see pie below) and 61.8% of social assistance schemes.

 

Fact #3. More data points on coverage levels are also starting to emerge, especially in social assistance. A preliminary estimate of the number of beneficiaries specifically supported via COVID-related introductions, expansions, and adaptations of programs is 594 million. Those beneficiaries include both individuals (for programs like public works) and households (e.g., for conditional cash transfers), pending on how they are reported. On one hand, such estimate is conservative given that not all programs report coverage (especially planned schemes); on the other hand, the estimate also includes schemes for which programs envisioned administrative adaptations, such as providing the same level of benefits but paid in a more user-friendly way. Clearly, global coverage levels are largely driven by India, but sizable levels can be observed in several countries, especially in Asia.

 

Fact #4. In terms of social insurance, paid sick leave is the most frequently-adopted measure, including in countries like Algeria, El Salvador, Finland and Lebanon. Unemployment benefits are also widely used, including for example in Romania, Russia, and South Africa. Deferring or subsidizing social contributions are observed in Montenegro, Germany and the Netherlands among others.

 

Fact #5. Labor market interventions are another key way in which governments are providing support to formal and informal sector workers (i.e., we don’t include demand-side actions on the labor markets). Wage subsidies account for 59% of the global labor market portfolio, with programs being implemented in Jamaica, Kosovo, Malaysia and Thailand. Activation measures (worker trainings) are also being considered inter alia in Bosnia and Herzegovina, China and Romania.

 

Fact #6. Compared to last week, programs are less unevenly distributed across regions and country income groups. Importantly, measures are being introduced in low-income countries, although only on social assistance and insurance. In those contexts, social assistance measures mostly include administrative adaptations, in-kind transfers, school feeding, and utility waivers. As such, there appears to be very limited cash transfer program expanded or introduced (Tajikistan is one example). 

 

Please find attached additional information. I hope you are able to enjoy a bit of the weekend with your families.  

 

 

 

 

 

Best regards, 

Sebastian 

 

Sebastian Molineus

Regional Director for the South Caucasus

Europe and Central Asia, The World Bank

Follow me on Twitter @SMolineus

 

Sent from my iPad

 

On Apr 3, 2020, at 17:07, Sebastian-A Molineus wrote:



Dear all – I attach for information the Korea case study shared with us by the government of Korea, in case of interest. 

 

Kind regards,

Sebastian

 

 

Sebastian Molineus
Regional Director for the South Caucasus
Europe and Central Asia
+995 (32) 291 6238
M +995 (577) 78 7821
M +1 (202) 492-3914
E  smolineus@worldbank.org
W www.worldbank.org/en/region/eca

 @smolineus

www.linkedin.com/in/molineus/

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

From: Sebastian-A Molineus
Sent: Friday, March 27, 2020 7:24 PM
To: i.matchavariani@mof.ge; etikaradze@moh.gov.ge
Cc: n.gagua@mof.ge; tgabunia@moh.gov.ge; Evgenij Najdov ; Lire Ersado ; Abdulaziz Faghi ; Jan Van Bilsen
Subject: RE: Our standing WB offer to support the government of Georgia during the COVID-19 crisis

 

Dear Ministers, Dear Ekaterine and Ivane –

 

Please find attached an updated World Bank paper on Social Protection and Jobs Responses to COVID-19: A Real-Time Review of Country Measures.  I trust you will find this paper useful as you design your social protection policy measures along with our teams within the framework of the upcoming Fast Track COVID-19 Response Facility that your government has requested. 

 

As usual, we stand ready to support and answer any questions you may have. 

 

Kind regards,

Sebastian

 

 

Sebastian Molineus
Regional Director for the South Caucasus
Europe and Central Asia
+995 (32) 291 6238
M +995 (577) 78 7821
M +1 (202) 492-3914
E  smolineus@worldbank.org
W www.worldbank.org/en/region/eca

 @smolineus

www.linkedin.com/in/molineus/

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

From: Sebastian-A Molineus
Sent: Thursday, March 26, 2020 7:12 PM
To: koba.gvenetadze@nbg.gov.ge; nturnava@moesd.gov.ge; i.matchavariani@mof.ge; etikaradze@moh.gov.ge
Cc: Archil.Mestvirishvili@nbg.gov.ge; emikabadze@moesd.gov.ge; n.gagua@mof.ge; tgabunia@moh.gov.ge; Evgenij Najdov <enajdov@worldbank.org>; Lire Ersado <lersado@worldbank.org>; Abdulaziz Faghi <afaghi@worldbank.org>; Jan Van Bilsen <jvanbilsen@ifc.org>
Subject: RE: Our standing WB offer to support the government of Georgia during the COVID-19 crisis

 

Dear colleagues –

 

Please find attached a note on ‘Managing the Employment Impacts of the COVID-19 Crisis’, produced by the World Bank Jobs Group. It reviews a variety of available policy options in a succinct and practical manner, and I hope you find it useful and timely.

 

As always, please let me know if you have any questions or would like for us to organize a follow-up discussion with our World Bank experts. 

 

Thank you and kind regards,

Sebastian

 

 

Sebastian Molineus
Regional Director for the South Caucasus
Europe and Central Asia
+995 (32) 291 6238
M +995 (577) 78 7821
M +1 (202) 492-3914
E  smolineus@worldbank.org
W www.worldbank.org/en/region/eca

 @smolineus

www.linkedin.com/in/molineus/

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

From: Sebastian-A Molineus
Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2020 6:27 PM
To: koba.gvenetadze@nbg.gov.ge; nturnava@moesd.gov.ge; i.matchavariani@mof.ge; etikaradze@moh.gov.ge
Cc: Archil.Mestvirishvili@nbg.gov.ge; emikabadze@moesd.gov.ge; n.gagua@mof.ge; Evgenij Najdov <enajdov@worldbank.org>; Lire Ersado <lersado@worldbank.org>; Abdulaziz Faghi <afaghi@worldbank.org>; Jan Van Bilsen <jvanbilsen@ifc.org>; tgabunia@moh.gov.ge
Subject: RE: Our standing WB offer to support the government of Georgia during the COVID-19 crisis

 

Dear colleagues –

 

FYI, I am attaching two scientific articles from Harvard University and ISI/ GISC on the effectiveness of social distancing strategies, as well as two World Bank papers, the first of which looks at the lessons-learned from Italy’s COVID-19 response and the second reviewing Global Social Protection Responses to COVID-19, which I know you are contemplating as we speak.  I have summarized key take-aways below: 

  • https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/42638988: The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic is straining healthcare resources worldwide, prompting social distancing measures to reduce transmission intensity. The amount of social distancing needed to curb the SARS-CoV-2 epidemic in the context of seasonally varying transmission remains unclear. Using a mathematical model, we assessed that one-time interventions will be insufficient to maintain COVID-19 prevalence within the critical care capacity of the United States. Seasonal variation in transmission will facilitate epidemic control during the summer months but could lead to an intense resurgence in the autumn. Intermittent distancing measures can maintain control of the epidemic, but without other interventions, these measures may be necessary into 2022. Increasing critical care capacity could reduce the duration of the SARS-CoV-2 epidemic while ensuring that critically ill patients receive appropriate care.
  • https://covid-19-sds.github.io/assets/pdfs/Preliminary_Report_Effectiveness_of_social_distance_strategies_COVID-19.pdf: Key findings 1. School closures do not have a major impact on controlling the epidemic, despite closing them, infections keep occurring within the households and the community layers. 2. Passive social distance strategies are not enough to contain the epidemic, indicating that active strategies need to be established. For instance, large scale testing, remote symptoms monitoring, isolation and contact tracing. 3. School closures and self-distancing at 90% of adoption is a feasible strategy for minimizing the effects of the epidemic, but only if they are applied for a long period of time. 4. A full confinement is not feasible and will not solve the problem, without active measures in place after the confinement, since there would be a new outbreak. 5. If high resolution mobility data is available, our data-driven approach with real world data can be easily replicated for new cities or countries to measure the impact of social distance strategies and the epidemic.
  • Early lessons-learned from Italy: In response to previous epidemics of SARS and MERS, China, Singapore, and South Korea overhauled their emergency systems and strengthened public health and disease surveillance response systems, which enabled a swift response to the COVID-19 pandemics. Different countries worldwide have different levels of preparedness and have adopted different measures to combat COVID-19 pandemic, offering vital insight into the response. Lack of swift disease detection and containment measures can lead to overwhelmed health systems swiftly, and exceeding healthcare capacity can further exacerbate the community spread of SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19.  Timely disease control measures need to be accompanied with surge capacity to curb the exponential spread of COVID-19. The evidence suggests that travel restrictions only work if coupled with rapid testing, physical distancing, isolation, infection prevention and Control in HCWs etc. to break the chain of transmission.  In a globalized world where epidemics and pandemics are increasingly common, pandemic surge planning using the 4 S framework (Space, Stuff, Staff, and System) can enable bolstered surge response. The proposed recommendations contain short, medium, and long-term measures to operationalize surge response to COVID-19 in Italy; including short-term measures to scale up surge response using the 4 S framework; medium and long-term measures of gap analysis for legislative and institutional reforms, and health system strengthening respectively.
  • A Global Review of Social Protection Responses to COVID-19: As of March 20, 2020, a total of 45 countries have introduced, adapted or expanded social protection programs in response to COVID-19. The most widely used measures include: cash transfers (30 programs), followed by wage subsidies (11), subsidized sick leave (10), and various forms of subsidized social security contributions and unemployment insurance.  A total of 13 new cash transfer programs have been introduced, like for example in Bolivia, India, Iran and Peru.  A universal, one-off cash payment to all citizens will occur in Hong-Kong and Singapore.  New in-kind schemes have also been launched, such as food vouchers in Taiwan and Seattle in the United States. Countries are adapting existing social assistance programs in various ways, by for instance: (i) anticipating payments of future cash transfer programs (Colombia and Indonesia); (ii) ensuring additional payments, often on a one-off basis (e.g., Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Turkey); (iii) providing more generous benefit levels (e.g., China); (iv) increasing the coverage of existing cash schemes (e.g., Brazil) and public works (Uzbekistan); (v) enhancing agility by suspending conditionalities in the UK and Italy; and (vi) providing innovative design solutions, such as school feeding programs delivering food directly to children’s homes or nearby centers (Jamaica and India’s Kerala state) or adapting their financing (Japan).  Income support in the form of childcare vouchers or allowances were provided in Italy, Poland and South Korea.  Other social assistance programs include support for homeless populations as planned in Spain; utility subsidies waiving fees for basic services are present in El Salvador; and wavers for loans and other financial obligations (e.g., Bolivia).  Many countries provide cash benefits to crisis-affected self-employed workers (e.g., Ireland, Portugal, New Zealand) and those in the informal sector (India). Some countries (e.g., Netherland) are reducing work time among the wage employed, combined with paid sick leave. Sweden is reducing the administrative time required for sick-leave payments, while Switzerland is doing so for the unemployment insurance process.  Delivery innovations are also emerging in Jordan (new cash program using same registration form of existing schemes), Japan (uploading transfers on phones), and Romania (enhanced electronic processes for benefits).

I hope you find these useful.

 

Kind regards,

Sebastian

 

 

Sebastian Molineus
Regional Director for the South Caucasus
Europe and Central Asia
+995 (32) 291 6238
M +995 (577) 78 7821
M +1 (202) 492-3914
E  smolineus@worldbank.org
W www.worldbank.org/en/region/eca

 @smolineus

www.linkedin.com/in/molineus/

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

From: Sebastian-A Molineus
Sent: Sunday, March 22, 2020 12:31 PM
To: koba.gvenetadze@nbg.gov.ge; nturnava@moesd.gov.ge; i.matchavariani@mof.ge
Cc: Archil.Mestvirishvili@nbg.gov.ge; emikabadze@moesd.gov.ge; n.gagua@mof.ge; Evgenij Najdov <enajdov@worldbank.org>; Lire Ersado <lersado@worldbank.org>; Abdulaziz Faghi <afaghi@worldbank.org>; Jan Van Bilsen <jvanbilsen@ifc.org>
Subject: RE: Our standing WB offer to support the government of Georgia during the COVID-19 crisis

 

Dear Ministers and Governor, Dear Natia, Ivane, and Koba -

please find attached a global compendium of financial sector policy measures relevant to combatting the economic fall-out from COVID-19.  The document remains a work in progress and is in draft form, but given the speed at which everything is evolving I’d rather share this document with you sooner than later.  I will of course continue to share relevant updates with you.  I also share with you a set of broader policy measures undertaken by the EU member countries, again for info.  

COVID-19 outbreak: Classification of Policy Measures Related to the Financial Sector

Draft March 18, 2020

Monetary and liquidity measures

  • Easing of policy rates
  • Liquidity support (e.g., OMO/repo, standing facilities, FX, minimum reserve requirements, collateral)
  • Credit easing (e.g. purchases of corporate, government, MBS paper; outright support to SMEs)
  • Easing Emergency Liquidity Assistance (e.g., loosening of collateral criteria)

Financial institution measures

Prudential and integrity

  • Easing/draw down of capital buffers (e.g., counter-cyclical, capital conservation)
  • Easing limits on large exposures
  • Easing of liquidity requirements (in foreign and local currency)
  • Forbearance of NPL classification, past due classification
  • Suspension of accounting standards (e.g. IFRS 9) or provisioning rules
  • Lower certain risks weights (e.g., loans with government guarantees)
  • Easing of macro-prudential measures (e.g., LTVs, DTIs)
  • Restrictions on dividend payments
  • Limit foreign exposures of banks and non-bank financial institutions
  • Ensure compliance of critical conduct and integrity rules to mitigate market abuse

Support for borrowers in affected sectors (e.g., SMEs, tourism, exporters)

  • Encourage private institutions to provide short-term cash support, waive fees and penalties, etc.
  • Moratorium on repayments, incl. mortgages (e.g., missed payments added to principal)
  • Support targeted restructuring of loans
  • State (partial) guarantees on loans
  • State subsidies on borrowers’ repayments
  • State loans to affected companies, sectors (e.g., through state banks or C)

Crisis management

  • State guarantees on bank liabilities (e.g., deposit guarantees to avert runs)
  • Freeze on deposit withdrawals
  • Freeze on withdrawal of open-ended funds
  • Capital injections, bailouts, bail-ins, and nationalization
  • Additional (backstop) funding to deposit guarantee schemes

Other measures

  • Intensification of industry consultation, monitoring of large companies, and key markets
  • Review business continuity and disaster recovery plans
  • Review of supervisory reporting requirements and methods as staff cannot access systems
  • Closing of bank branches and ATMs to prevent COVID-19 spread
  • Stimulate use of digital payments to prevent COVID-19 spread
  • Review regulations (KYC) to allow for remote interactions (e.g. refinancing mortgages, SME loans)

Financial markets measures

Market support

  • FX market interventions by Central Bank
  • FX swap lines with other Central Banks
  • Outright asset purchases (e.g., securities of affected companies, sectors)

Market intervention

  • Halting of trading, bans on (naked) short selling
  • Temporary restrictions on cross-border capital (out)flows

Public Debt Management measures

  • Establish basis for decision-making and developing communications strategy
  • Identify funding from other sources to reduce pressure on traditional wholesale market borrowing
  • Adapt the funding program to shifts in the demand for government paper
  • Ensure minimal functionality in the primary and secondary markets

 

 

Kind regards,

Sebastian

 

 

Sebastian Molineus
Regional Director for the South Caucasus

<20200321_Korea_Response.pdf>